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BOOK REVIEWS
Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, by Richard E. Creel.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Pp. xi and 238. $39.50.
RONALD 1. FEENSTRA, Marquette University.
The recent revival of interest in philosophical theology has led to renewed attention
to a number of features of traditional theism, including such assertions as that God
is simple, eternal, immutable, and impassible. Theologians, process thinkers, and
analytic philosophers of religion have devoted much effort to determining whether
these claims about God are coherent and, if so, whether they are compatible with
statements that God is loving, active in history, and responsive to prayer. Richard
E. Creel's Divine Impassibility addresses these issues in an impressive and important defense of the doctrine of divine impassibility. Creel's work includes extensive
interaction with the thought of both Thomas Aquinas and Charles Hartshorne.
Creel cuts through the jungle of debate about impassibility by pointing out that
God could be said to be impassible in nature, in will, in knowledge, and in feeling.
He then observes that even advocates of divine passibility generally do not hold
that God is pas sible in nature. Creel endorses the widespread agreement among
philosophical theologians that God's nature cannot be affected or changed by
anything-not even by God. God's nature is impassible.
In his discussion of God's will, Creel rejects the position of those who say that a
being that is impassible in will cannot respond to others and therefore cannot be
loving. He suggests that God's impassible will could be eternally indexed to all
future possibilities so that all of the intentions God will ever have have always
existed. Creel describes his position as follows:
... as a result of a change in us (repentance), we experience God's forgiveness at t2 rather than his wrath, as at t l , because he has eternally willed
that if we did a l at tl we would experience his wrath and if we did a 2 at t2
we would experience his forgiveness (p. 27).
God's "response" to an action we perform, therefore, involves no change in God's
will, but only a change in our experience of God's eternal will.
While Creel holds that God knows all future contingent possibilities, he agrees
with Hartshorne that God does not foreknow future individuals and events, saying
that". . . a thing cannot be known as actual before it becomes actual." Creel offers
a sympathetic yet critical discussion of Hartshorne's views of God's omniscience
and future events.
Creel rejects the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, arguing that this doctrine cannot
account for the existence of possibilities that God then actualized in creating the
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world. He instead proposes and defends the existence of a plenum, which is
uncreated, distinct from God, and the repository of all possibilities not inherent
in God. Creation by God involves God's acting upon the plenum so as to cause
some of its non-actualized possibilities to become actual. Creel unfortunately
does not explore the relationship between his concept of the plenum and recent
discussions of the ontology of possible worlds.
In discussing God's impassibility in knowledge, Creel argues that, while God's
knowledge of abstract possibilities is impassible, God's knowledge of concrete
possibilities is both passible and dependent upon the changing character of concrete possibilities. In addition, God lacks knowledge of the future free actions
of free creatures. So Creel holds that God has impassible knowledge of that part
of the future that is entirely dependent upon his will, but has no knowledge of
future events that are contingent upon the decisions of free creatures.
Creel argues that there is no sufficient reason for rejecting God's impassibility
in feeling. God's relationship to free creatures does not require God's passibility
in feeling. He says that God's purpose in creating free creatures was to give
them the opportunity to choose freely whether they want to be part of his kingdom.
Free creatures' choice for God's kingdom makes a contribution to, but neither
increases nor decreases the intensity or purity, of God's happiness. So God can
be perfectly happy whatever happens to his free creatures in this life, and whether
they choose for or against his kingdom. Not even the creation of the world
requires God's passibility in feeling. If God had not created a world, says Creel,
the content of his happiness would have been different than it is now, but the
perfection of his happiness would have been unaffected.
In his last chapter, Creel argues that God can create the best possible world.
In creating, God made morally free creatures over whose actions he has no
control and whose free choices he does not foreknow. So God cannot unilaterally
create the best possible world if that implies creating a world with morally free
creatures and no moral evil. God can, however, create a world optimally suited
to morally free creatures, a world that both respects their freedom and provides
for their welfare in ways that other worlds could equal but not surpass. Creel
describes the best possible world as follows: (1) there is no evil in this world
that could have been prevented without diminishing the good that obtains in it;
(2) the free creatures that inhabit this world have freely willed to live in it by
choosing, during the world's initial phase, in favor of God's kingdom; and (3)
those free creatures who have chosen God's kingdom are everlastingly both
perfectly happy subjectively and beneficiaries of increasingly higher levels of
bliss. Creel holds both that such a world could take infinitely many forms and
that God could create such a world. He adds that, since no other world can be
actualized once God actualizes a given possible world, any world God actualizes
will be both the only possible world and the best possible world. So the actual
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world did not become the best possible world (as well as the only possible world)
until God actualized it.
Creel's book offers much for philosophical theologians to ponder and much
with which to disagree. Two noteworthy virtues of the book are its distinctions
among four senses in which God can be said to be impassible and its wrestling
with the thought of both Aquinas and Hartshorne. The book is also reasonably
clear and well-written.
The book suffers from a number of defects. First, in discussing God's will,
Creel does not adequately consider the following objection to his position. If
God's will is indexed to future actions of free human agents, and if God does
not foreknow those future free actions, then what has been determined is only
what God intends to will if certain future circumstances hold. Since what God's
will actually is, however, depends upon the free actions of creatures, according
to Creel, God's will is, in an important sense, passible or mutable. If our action
at t2 determines whether we experience God's wrath or God's forgiveness at tb
and if our experience of God accurately reflects God's attitude towards us, then
God's will either to forgive or to be angry with us seems to be both pas sible
and dependent upon our actions. If, on the other hand, there is no real difference
in God between expressing wrath and showing forgiveness, then the concepts
of forgiveness and wrath that are applied to God seem to be unrelated to the
ordinary senses of these concepts.
Second, Creel seems to think that God's foreknowledge of future contingent
events involves God's considering these future events to be actual before they
become actual. The advocate of God's knowledge of future contingent events
would, however, say that God knows future events as future until they occur,
at which time God knows that they have occurred.
Finally, Creel adheres to a peculiar notion of possibility, so that any world
actualized by God thereby becomes the only possible world. This permits him
to say that the actual world is the best possible world since no possible world
can surpass it in goodness, given God's creation of this world. It seems that he
should also admit that the actual world is the worst possible world, since there
is no possible world worse than this world, given God's creation of it. What
Creel fails to see is that, while the actualization of one possible world indeed
precludes the actualization of other possible worlds, these other worlds are still
logically possible because they could have been actual.
Creel's book should be studied by philosophical theologians who are interested
in either the impassibility of God or the differences between the concepts of God
in Aquinas and Hartshorne. The book contains an index and helpful bibliographies
for each chapter.

